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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CERRRITOS TRUCKING CO., a
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UTAH VENTURE NO. 1,
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FERN E. LOWENBERG. and
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
DefendantsAppellants.
No.

17185

UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a corporation and
WILLIAM J . LOWENBERG,
Cross PlaintiffsAppellants,
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BETTI LYON REALTY COMPA..~,
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Cross-DefendantsRespondents.
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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
AND CROSS-DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT DUNAHOO
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents herein believe that appellants' statement
of the case is incorrect on a number of important particulars.
These areas of dispute on the facts will be discussed each in
turn.
It is alleged by appellants on pages 5 and 6 of their
brief, and they would lead the Court to believe, that the
officers of Fiber Science were planning on purchasing the
property in question totally by themselves.

Their brief states

that:
However, Mr. Dunahoo and several of his vice
presidents, the Fiber Science's group, determined that
they, in their individual capacities, wished to
purchase the property and in turn lease it to
Fiber-Sciences.
{Appellants' Brief p. 5).
The brief also speaks of "the desire of the officers
of Fiber-Sciences to own the Property,"

(Appellant Brief p. 6)

and "Fiber-Sciences determined to purchase, not lease, the
Property from Lowenberg."

(Appellant Brief p. 6).

The

transcript cited by appellants in support of those allegations,
however makes it very clear that the contemplation from the
very beginning for all parties was that Respondent Dunahoo and
some of his vice presidents in Fiber Science, Inc. were
interested only in participating in the ownership of the
property.

It was never expected that they by themselves would
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own the property,

if for no other reason that they did not have

the financial capacity to own any more than twenty-five percent
(25%) of the property in question.
Dunahoo

te~tified

For example, respondent

as follows in answer to questioning from

appellants' counsel:
Q.

All right.
Consider your financial status at the
time, and those that you were contemplating
participating, did you have an idea of what your
capability of participation would be?

A.

It appeared to be approximately 25 percent.

Q.

All right. Now, you were the president of Fiber
Science at this time, as you've earlier
testified. What made you believe that you could
participate in the ownership of the building that
was being leased to your own company?

A.

My understanding of the corporate policy was if
it were an arms-length deal that it would be
satisfactory to be involved in such an
attange:nent.

Q,

Did you believe that this was an arms-length deal?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On what basis?

A.

Because we had negotiated a lease with Cerritos
Trucking that was less than was being requested
for the building originally.

(Tr. pp. 143-144).
Q.

The question was:
Did you ever attempt to lease
that property from Bill Lowenberg?

A.

No, we did not.

Q.

All right.
property?

A.

That's correct.

Q,

You determined that you would rather buy it?

You were in the market to lease
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A.

It was determined that if we could be involved in
it, we would rather have Cerritos buy it so we
could be involved in that investment.

(Tr, pp. 150-151)
At no time was it ever represented to appellants or to
the real estate agent Daughtrey by plaintiffs-respondents or by
cross Defendant-Respondent Dunahoo that Dunahoo and the Fiber
science vice presidents would own all of the property in
question.

In fact of the matter, once the building in question

was selected, no one from Fiber Science was directly involved
with the negotiations on the purchase of the same.

(Tr. pp.

111-112; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. pp. 154-155; testimony of
Dunahoo; Tr. pp. 69-70; testimony of Heimark.)
It is also alleged by appellants that the proposal
given to Mr. Lowenberg was that Fiber Science, Inc. would lease
the property in question only if an option to purchase the
property was granted to "the Fiber-Sciences group" (identified
in the brief as Respondent Dunahoo and several of his vice
presidents).

(Appellant Brief pp. 5-6.) The actual fact is

that no such contingent offer was made.
Daughtrey.)

(Tr. 207; testimony of

The only offer to purchase brought by Daughtrey to

Lowenberg were from Respondents Heimark and Fleming and not
from the Fiber Science people.

(Tr. pp. 130-131; testimony of

Daughtrey. )
It is alleged in the· appellants' brief on page B that
Appellant Lowenberg heard rumors sometime in late January or
early February of 1979 that Fiber Science people would not own

-3-
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the building.

The evidence as to that point is clear that on

or around January 26, 1979, at a meeting at which Daughtrey,
Heimark and Dunahoo along with appellant Lowenberg were in
attendance, and that Lowenberg was explicitly told that the
Fiber Science people were not able to participate in the
purchase of the building in question.

(Tr. #pp. 145-146;

testimony of Dunahoo; Tr. pp. 211-212; testimony of
Daughtrey.)

Despite having learned in January 1979, of the

inability of the Fiber Science people to participate in the
purchase, it was not until April 1979 or at the earliest late
March, 1979, that the notice of recission (Ex. SP) was sent.
(Tr. p. 223; testimony of Lowenberg.)

It is also of importance

to the factual context of this case that it be noted that on
February 28. 1979, i.e., almost exactly one month after the
discussion in which appellant was told that the Fiber Science
people would not participate in the purchase, that
plaintiffs-respondents paid into an escrow the full amount of
the purchase price.

On that occasion appellants, represented

by legal counsel, put into the same escrow a warranty deed
representing the transfer of the property to plaintiffs-respondents.

(Ex. 7P.)
Although there are other areas where respondents would

dispute the correctness of the facts as alleged by appelants,
perhaps respondents' position can best be summed up by
directing this Court to the Findings of Fact signed by the
lower court and on file herein.

-4-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS DID NOT SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING
MISREPRESENTATION
Repeatedly throughout the appellants' brief the
allegation is made that because there are some disputed facts,
it was error that the case was not submitted to the jury.

That

this is not the case is clear from the very cases cited by
appellants in support of their own position.

See, e.g.,

Boskovich v. Utah Const. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885
(1953).

There the court held that "where there is no evidence

upon a material part of the plaintiff's claim, it is the
court's duty to direct a verdict."

259 P.2d at 886.

Likewise, in other cases cited by the appellants, this
Court has held that a directed verdict is proper where there is
no "substantial" contradictory or disputed evidence.
Flynn v.

w.

L.

w.

P. Harlin Constr. Co., 590 P.2d 356 (Utah 1973);

Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 240, 240 P.2d 491 (1952).

In

other words, the fact that appellant Lowenberg at the time of
trial attempted to contravene the corroborated testimony of
respondents by making uncorroborated self-serving statements is
not sufficient to have the matter go to the jury.

First, the

testimony has to be sufficient that reasonable minds could
differ.
items.

Second, that evidence has to go to

substantive

Third, appellants have to establish their entire case

and not simply have a dispute on the evidence on part of their
case.
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As discussed herein, it is the contention of
respondents that as to material items claimed to be in dispute,
reasonable minds could .not differ from the ruling reached by
the trial court on the basis of the

evidenc~

presented.

~s

to

those items for which there is any real dispute, such items
were not substantive and were only peripheral.

In addition,

most of the critical elements of the claims under which
appellants were proceeding were never established in their
favor, even taking the evidence in a light most favorable to
them.
Appellants' brief very nicely lays out the elements
which appellants needed to establish before they could receive
a verdict in their favor on the claim of misrepresentation,
which is really the only claim brought by them before this
Court.

On each point the only evidence, if it can be called

such, presented by appellants were the self-serving statements
of appellant Lowenberg.
the other witnesses.

There was no corroboration by any of

In fact, the conduct and actions of

appellant Lowenberg, as verified by his own testimony, speaks
against him.

Moreover, appellants failed to present any

evidence at all in their favor regarding some of the critical
elements of their claim.

Thus, the lower court was quite

justified in determining as it did that appellants had not
proven a cause of action sounding in fraud or misrepresentation.

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A·

No Evidence of a Misrepresentation.
Appellants claim that there was a misrepresentation of

a material fact.

The misrepresentation they rely on is a claim

that appellant Lowenberg was told by Daughtrey, the real estate
agent employed by respondent Bettilyon, that the Fiber Science
people wanted to buy the property in question and that unless
they could purchase the property, Fiber Science, Inc. would not
lease the building.

Appellant Lowenberg claims that except for

that representation, he never would have considered selling the
property to anyone.

He further claims that he was motivated to

sell the building to the officers of Fiber Science in order to
win the good graces and further business as a tenant of Fiber
Science, Inc.
It is readily apparent that the very claim made by
appellants on appeal is contradictory.

The one claimed basis

for relief implies a certain blackmail or coersion to sell the
building.

The second indicates a readiness to sell the

building in order to promote goodwill but that the intended
beneficiaries did not receive the benefit intended.

Despite

that anomaly, both assertions are rested on the basic and
underlying claim that the Fiber Science people would, in fact,
be the purchasers of the building in question.
If the record is devoid of evidence either that the
representation as stated was not in fact made by these
respondents, or that, if made, was not false at the time it was
made, then appellants' cause of action fails for having failed
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to establish the most fundamental aspect of their entire case,
namely a misrepresentation.

This court has in fact even stated

it stronger, requiring in Jardine v. Brunswick

Corporation, 18

Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967) that the one making the
representation must either intentionally misstate the facts
(which is really an action in fraud), or else have "a pecuniary
interest in a transaction, [be] in a superior position to know
material facts, and carelessly or negligently [make] a false
" 423 P.2d at 662.

representation concerning them

Appellant Lowenberg testified that he was not a close
personal friend of respondent Dunnahoo prior to the signing of
the lease and option on April 28, 1978.
of Lowenberg.)

(Tr. p. 221; testimony

Appellant Lowenberg also testified under

examination by his own counsel that he did not know the names
of the other officers of Fiber Science whom he expected to
benefit:
Q.

Now, at that time did you know the names of the
officers of Fiber Science?

A.

I had only met two officers of Fiber Science.

Q,

Did you intend to allow them, the officers of
Fiber Science, to have this concession because
they were friends of yours?

A.

No, they were not friends.

Q.

It was because of business consideration?

A.

Business consideration.

(Tr. 217; testimony of Lowenberg.)
In short, Lowenberg's testimony is that based on a
one-time meeting with Dunahoo and one other officer of Fiber
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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science, he was induced to give a valuable concession to people
he did not know, even by name, as a good business manueuver.
Futher he claims that he would not have made the concession had
he known that the said individuals from Fiber Science (whom he
did not know) were not going to participate and that the
partners of Cerritos Associates,

(whom he claims he also did

not know), were in fact going to be the ultimate purchasers.
It is also interesting to note from appellant Lowenberg's own
testimony that he did not even tell the Fiber Science people
they were getting a benefit or a concession.
Q.

Mr. Lowenberg, isn't it true that you -- that
prior to -- or, prior to April 28, 1978, you had
no written agreement with the Fiber Science
people showing any participation in the purchase
of the property in question?

A..

That's correct.

Q.

And it just as true, Mr. Lowenberg, that you
never told anyone from Fiber Science prior to
April 28, 1978, that you were giving them a good
deal?

A.

I

never discussed a good or a bad deal. We -there was no reason for me to say "a good deal."

(Tr. p. 63; testimony of Lowenberg.)
From the record one cannot find any form of
corroborated representation at all to Lowenberg that the offer
to lease was contingent upon the sale to the Fiber Science
people.

While it is undisputed that the Fiber Science people

did have an interest in participating in the purchase of the
property, all of the witnesses except Lowenberg were explicit
that (1) the participation would be limited, ·{"'2) would be
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determined in the future, and (3) the lease was independent of
the sale.

(Tr. pp. 128, 207; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. pp.

141, 143; testimony of Dunahoo;

Tr. pp. 106-107; testimony of

Heimark.)
Although Daughtrey was never clearly established as
appellants' agent, he was definitely never established as
plaintiffs-respondents representative or agent.

Hence

regardless of whatever appellant Lowenberg claims Daughtrey
told him, such statements (largely denied by Daughtrey) do not
in any way constitute representations by plaintiffsrespondents.

Nowhere in any of the testimony were appellants

successful in attributing directly to plaintiffs-respondents or
to third-party respondent Dunahoo any statement even closely
resembling the claim that if the property were not sold, Fiber
Science would not lease the building.
In short, appellants have not established a
misrepresentation by these respondents.

That portion of the

claim missing, their entire claim falls.
B.

There was no Misrepresentation as to a Presently

Existing Fact.
The second element outlined in appellants' brief as a
requirement to sustain their claim is that the representation
be as to a presently existing fact.

Appellants' brief,

however, incorrectly characterizes the argument made by
plaintiffs-respondents on that point at trial.

It is not

because the option called for conduct to take place in the

-10-
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future that these respondents claim that the representation was
not as to a presently existing fact.

Rather, the future

conduct is based on the understanding and agreement between the
Fiber Science people and plaintiffs-respondents that the
determination of the extent of the participation in the
ownership of the building by the Fiber Science people would
come at a later date.

In other words, plaintiffs-respondents

were the ones who signed the lease and option and who paid the
earnest money.

The Fiber Science people expected to be able to

participate but there was no definite agreement as to when they
would participate or to what extent.

As of the day of the

signing of the lease and option by Cerritos Trucking, Dunahoo
indicated that there was no confirmed committment by any of the
Fiber Science that they would in fact purchase nor was there
any percentage set as to the amount in which they would
participate.

The only thing they knew was that plaintiffs-res-

pondents were willing to let them participate up to fifty
percent (50%) but that based on their financial capability at
that time they would only be able to participate up to about
twenty five percent (25%).

(Tr. p. 143; testimony of Dunahoo.)

Heimark also testified similarly, stating that as of
that date he did not know who all the participants would be,
much less the amount of participation.
of Heimark.)

(Tr. p. 107; testimony

Hence the participation, by whom, and to what

extent was a matter set for the future and was not decided
either at the time of the alleged misrepresentation or by_ the

-11-
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time the option and lease agreement had been signed by
plaintiffs-respondents.

The participation issue had nothing to

do with exercising of the option, particularly since it was
determined by the Fiber Science people prior to the exercising
of the option that the Fiber Science people could not
participate at all in the purchase of the building in question.

c.

The Representation was not False at the Time it was

Given.
A claim based on a promise of future events which at
the time it was made was true, or was reasonably expected to be
true, is not actionable when it is later determined not to be
true.

Thus in Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608

F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979) rehearing, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.
1980), the court stated:
A promise of future action or a prediction of future
events does not, standing alone, constitute the
necessary false representation of an existing fact for
common law fraud.
As further stated in the case of Miller v. Premier Corp.,
608 F.2d 973 (4th Cir: 1979) the court held:
A false prediction or a promise of future events
generally cannot be a basis for fraud because it is
not a representation, there is no right to rely on it,
and it is not false when made •
At the time of the negotiations and at the time of the
signing of the lease and option agreement, respondent Dunahoo
gave testimony that he had a reasonable basis to believe that
he could participate in the purchase of the said property.
testimony, uncontradicted by appellants, is as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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His

Q.

All right.
Now, you were the president of Fiber
Science at this tirae, as you have earlier
testified. \·lhat made you believe that you could
participate in the ownership of the building that
was being _leased to your own company?

A.

My understanding of the corpor~te policy was if
it were an arms length deal that it would be
satisfactory to be involved in such an
arrangement.

Q.

Did you believe that this was an arms length deal?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On what basis?

A.

Because we had negotiated a lease with Cerritos
Trucking that was less than was being requested
for the building originally.

(Tr. pp. 143-144; testimony of Dunahoo)
In a case cited by appellants in their brief, this.
Court likewise has held that representations or statements of
future acts or conduct constitute actionable misrepresentation,
only if the intent of the one making the representations at the
time they were given was different than represented.

Berkeley

Bank for Coops. v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980).

Thus in

accord with that case, appellants had to prove "fraudulent
intention" not to perform in the future existing on the part of
respondents at the time the claimed misrepresentation was made.
The fact that there was a subsequent decision by the
parent company of Fiber Science that the Fiber Science people
could not participate in the purchase of the building does not
change the fact that up to that time the officers of Fiber
Science had good reason to believe they couid participate in
the purchase of the property in question.
-13-

Hence there was no
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misrepresentation in the statement made by Daughtrey to
Lowenberg that the Fiber Science officers wanted to participate
in the purchase of the building.

o.

The Representation to Lowenberg was not Material.
If the parties to a transaction are essentially

strangers, a statement that other strangers will also
participate in the purchase can hardly be said to be material
to the sale.

As noted above, appellant Lowenberg admitted that

he hardly knew the Fiber Science people.

The offer to purchase

that came to him in the form of an earnest money agreement was
signed by Cerritos Trucking.

The checks that were paid to him

were signed by Fleming and Heimark.
respondent Dunahoo's name.

Nowhere did he see

Nowhere did he see any written

reference to the Fiber Science officers particpating in the
purchase of the property.

The option and lease agreements were

made with Cerritos Trucking and its assigns without
reservation.

There was no mention in any of those documents of

the Fiber Science people, either individually or as a group.
Lowenberg insisted on receiving financial data from Cerritos
Trucking and its parent Triangle Distributing.

However,

similar requests were not made for financial data from the
Fiber Science people.

The testimony on this point went as

follows:
Q.

Prior to the April 28, 1978 visit, had you given
any financial information to Mr. Lowenberg on
behalf of Cerritos Trucking and Triangle
Distributing'?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

A.

Once we basically concluded negotiations with
Cerritos and Utah Venture No. 1, which is Mr.
Lowenberg, he did not know anything about the
Company at all, so he wanted some financial
statenents to be sure that they could afford the
lease payment.

Q.

Did he ask for any financial statements from Mr.
Dunahoo?

A.

No, he did not.

(Tr. p. 113; testimony of Daughtrey.)
Considering the information requested by appellant
Lowenberg of plaintiffs-respondents and not of the Fiber
Science people, considering the paucity of information about
the Fiber Science people which lay before appellant Lowenberg
at the time of the execution of the lease and option
agreements, and considering the failure to have any writing
confirmining or limiting the participation in the purchase, the
trial court was fully justified in determining that the element
of materiality of the representation was missing in this case.
E.

Lowenberg did not reasonably rely on the representation.
From all standards there was nothing reasonable about

appellant Lowenberg's claim that he relied on statements made
to him by Daughtrey that the Fiber Science people would
participate in the purchase of the property and that he
conditioned his sale of the property upon that event occuring.
However, Lowenberg is not the orginary seller.
and is an experienced realtor and developer.

He was not the

country boy taken in by big city fast talkers.
San Francisco legal counsel to assist him.

Lowenberg was

He had his own

In fact, they were
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the ones who drafted the option agreement and who reviewed all
of the documents prior to their being signed by appellant
Lowenberg. (Tr. p. 29; testimony of Lowenberg.)
Appellant Lowenberg did not avail himself of the
opportunity to confirm directly with the Fiber Science people
that they would in fact participate in the purchase of the
property.

He made no safeguards assuring himself that Cerritos

Trucking Company would be used only as a "vehicle" to acquire
the property.

He allowed the option to be assignable freely,

as evidenced by the option document itself.
hardly knew the Fiber Science people.

(See Ex. lP.)

He

Claimed representations

made by a real estate agent who was not an employee of either
Fiber Science or Cerritos Trucking, or employed or associated
by or with any of the principals of the same, were not tested
or challenged by appellants.
The testimony is that in January, 1979, Lowenberg was
definitely told that the Fiber Science people would not
participate in the

pu~chase

of the first building.

Lowenberg

himself admitted that at least by early February, 1979, he knew
that the Fiber Science people would not participate in the
first building. (Tr. p. 219; testimony of Lowenberg.)
allowed

Cerrito~

Yet he

Trucking to place its money in escrow the last

day of February, 1979, and signed a warranty deed conveying the
property to plaintiffs-respondents dated February 27, 1979.
was only at the very end of March, 1979, that he sent his
recision letter.

None of that conduct on the part of the
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It

average seller, much less an experienced.seller such as
appellant Lowenberg, shows any reliance on the claimed
representation as the sole basis for selling the property in
question.

The court was therefore fully justified in

determining that the

re~iance

claimed by appellant Lowenberg

was in fact unreasonable.
F.

There was no negligent representation to Lowenberg

that the Fiber Science people would own or participate in the
ownership of the property in question.
In one of the leading cases on the subject of
negligent misrepresentation, the court in Ellis v. Hale, 13
Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 {1962) noted that negligent
misrepresentation can only lie "when there is a special duty of
care running from the representer to the representee."
Aside from the argument, stated above, that the Fiber Science
people had a reasonable basis to believe they could in some way
participate in the ownership of the property in question, there
is absolutely no evidence showing any type of a special
relationship running from either plaintiffs-respondents or from
third-party defendant-respondent Dunahoo to appellants or to
any of them.

As made clear even by testimony of appellant

Lowenberg, the parties hardly knew each other.

In fact, at one

point in his testimony appellant Lowenberg could not determine
whether he had even met any of plaintiffs-respondents prior to
the execution of the lease and option agreements.

(Tr. PP·

61-62; testimony of Lowenberg.)

-17-
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Even in the recently decided case of Dugan v. Jones,
565 P.2d 63 (Utah 1980) the Ellis v. Hale language is cited
with approval.

The court in that case also cited the latest

version of Section 552 of the Restatement of Torts second.

The

language of Section 552, apparently cited with approval in
appellants' brief, however gives no comfort to appellants.

To

prevail under that language would require evidence that
plaintiffs-respondents were the ones who supplied the incorrect
information, that it was supplied for the guidance of appellant
in making his business decision, that it was false when given,
and that plaintiffs-respondents failed to exercise reasonable
care or confidence in obtaining or communicating their
information.

The record does not reflect any evidence of

appelants having met those requirements.

Hence, the trial

court was justified in determining that evidence of negligent
misrepresentation was missing.
G.

Appellants have established no evidence of damage

based on the claim of misrepresentation.
Possibly the most important element of all of
appellants' claim, that of damages, is totally missing.

It is

true that the appraiser for appellants testified that the value
of the property in question at the time of the issuance of the
option could have been worth more than the option price.

That

fact by itself, however, does not in any way establish
damages.

As pointed out above, Appellant Lowenberg did not

even tell the Fiber Science people that he was conferring upon

-18-
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them a special benefit with regard to the price.

Appellant

r,owenberg also testified that his purpose in selling to the
Fiber Science people was to curry their good favor because this
~as his

first project in the area.

He was looking to Fiber

science to potentially lease even additional space from him.
The testimony of Lowenberg in this regard is most instructive
Q.

You wanted somebody to start out your first
building, to be your first tenant?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

But Fiber Science was not prepared to take your
whole first building; isn't that correct?

A.

At that point in time, no.

Q.

All right.
And isn't it true Mr. Lowenberg, that
since that time you had a long relationship with
Fiber Science and have been able to lease them
additional space in other buildings?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And so that that expectation that you had hoped
for has been met; is that not correct?

A.

Yes.

Appellant Lowenberg thus made it clear that the
"concession" to sell the building and the "favorable" price
stated in the option agreement were based solely on the
business consideration that the Fiber Science people would
thereby be induced to be good tenants and lease additional
The result he was seeking has happened; there

is no evidence of any damage whatsoever to appellants.

All

expectations have been met.

-19-

I

.,

I,

(Tr. p. 222; testimony of Lowenberg.)

space from him.

;

I
J
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Ironically, despite the lawsuit in question, appellant
Lowenberg claims he still has a good relationship with
respondent Dunahoo:
Q.

Now, you testified that you think highly of Fiber
-- of Fiber Science; is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you think highly of the Fiber Science
officers -- ?

A.

Yes.

Q.

--Is that correct? Mr. Dunahoo is an officer of
Fiber Science; isn't he?

A.

I know that.

Q.

Mr. Lowenberg, you have sued him in this action
for fraud?

A.

I did.

Q.

In your own thinking is that not inconsistent
with your high regard for him, charging him with
fraud on one hand and holding him in high esteem
on the other?

A.

Not at all.
I consider him to be a very fine
tenant, and as far as the tenancy relationship
between Ben [sic] and me is concerned its been
impeccable.

Q.

They have been good tenants?

A.

No question.

(Tr. pp. 224-225; testimony of Lowenberg)
In addition to establishing that appellants have
received everything which they expected out of the sale of the
property, the above conversation reflects the goodwill of the
Fiber Science people.

They were not allowed to participate in

the purchase of the building by their parent company.
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The

president of Fiber Science has been sued in this action.
Despite all of that, they are not only good tenants but have
increased the size of their leasehold space with appellant
Lowenbcrg.

Thus there is no evidence of damages by reason of

the claimed misrepresentation.

The trial court was fully

justified in ruling against appellants.
In summary of the above points A through G, appellants
have failed to provide any real evidence on the critical
elements which appellants have to prove in order to prevail on
their claim of misrepresentation.

In fact, the absence of any

one of the elements is sufficient to deny appellants relief,
and they have failed to meet any of the necessary elements,·
namely:

(1) That there was a representation;

or negligently given;

(3)

which was false when given;
material;

(2) intentionally

as to a present existing fact;

(4)

(5) which representation was

(6) and appellants reasonably relied on the

representation;

(7) to their injury.

Not only is the record

deficient on each of these elements, but they must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence as opposed to the preponderance
of the evidence.

1978).

Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951 (Utah

Hence, there was no basis at all to submit

to the jury.

the matter

That being the case, the decision of the lower

court should be sustained by this Court.
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POINT II
APPELLANTS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE AtlD/ OR BY THE S':'ATUTE OF FRAUDS
Appellants' brief appears to center on the question of
whether they should have been allowed to rescind the option
agreement in question.

In the complaint and during the trial

below, however, appellants attempted as an alternate course to
have the option agreement reformed or modified to require a
participation or an ownership interest by the Fiber Science
peiple.

However it was never established which of the

individuals from Fiber Science exactly would participate, if
they could, and the extent to which they would participate.

It

is thus obvious that it would not be proper for this Court to
permit a modification or reformation of the agreement to
include participation of ownership by the Fiber Science people.
In the event there is any question on the possibility
of reformation or modification of the agreement it should be
noted that the pertinent documents in this case are completely
clear and unambiguous in every respect.

They show that the

lease and the option was made to Cerritos Trucking or its
~"

assigns.

In fact, the option was assigned to Cerritos

Associates which is none other than the three principals of
Cerritos Trucking plus Cerritos Trucking itself.
(An ironic note to this whole matter is that the
purpose for the assignment to Cerritos Associates was for tax
benefits (Tr. p.76; testimony of Heimark.)

Yet apparently

except for that assignment appellants would have been willing

-22-
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to go through with the whole arrangement.

Allegedly it: was

upon learning that Cerritos Associates did not include the
Fiber Science people that the attempt to rescind came from
appellants.)
This Court has made it clear that parol evidence in
modification or reformation of ~~mbiguous documents is not
admissible unless there was a mutual mistake or fraud by the
other party.

See, e.g., Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah

1979) (Citing several other Utah cases on this point).

The

option between appellants and plaintiffs-respondents was clear
and unambiguous.

Hence, any modification or reformation of the

agreement could not be established by parol evidence unless
there was fraud by plaintiffs-respondents or a mutual mistake
betweeen the parties.

There was no fraud or misrepresentation

by plaintiffs-respondents, as fully discussed above.

The

record is also clear that there was no mutual mistake.
Plaintiffs-respondents were prepared to take the entire
purchase by themselves and did not in anyway depend on the
participation of the Fiber Science people.
testimony of Heimark.)

(Tr. p.89;

That being the case, parol evidence of

any type submitted by appellants was not admissable to modify
or reform the agreement between the parties.
Applicable provisions of the Utah Statute of Frauds
would likewise prohibit enforcement of any claimed oral
agreement eithr between appellants and the Fiber Science people
or between plaintiffs-respondents and the Fiber Science
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people.

The subject matter of any such agreement would have

involved the sale of property; thus it cannot be enforced.
Utah Code Ann. §§25-5-1 et seq.

POINT III
THERE \•lAS NO FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED APPELLANTS
Appellants have argued that plaintiffs-respondents had
"more than the usual purchaser-seller relationship" with them.
Appellants Brief, p. 35.

The fact is that,

if anything, the

parties had less than the usual buyer-seller relationship.

For

the most part, all dealings were through a third party, Mr.
Daughtrey.

Even at the time of signing the option and lease

agreements, plaintiffs-respondents were in Los Angeles and
appellant Lowenberg was in San Francisco.

Daughtrey

transported the agreements between the parties.
A fiduciary duty may be created by force of law, such
as in the case of attorney-client or trustee-beneficiary.

It

may also be created by the development of a confidential
relationship where one party has a valid reason to place a
special trust in another.
created by mere friendship.
(Utah 1978).

Such a relationship, however, is not
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298

Moreover, this Court had said that a buyer-seller

relationship by itself does not create a fiduciary duty.

Dugan

v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d
263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956).
Appellants have not shown any evidence of the creation
of a fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs-respondents.
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In

fact it is allegedly because plaintiffs-respondents were not
appellant Lowenberg's friends that he caused the recission
letter to go out.

(Tr. P· 219; testimony of Lowenberg.)

("I

decided that I had no obligation whatsoever to sell my building
to strangers.")
The relationship between appellants and respondent
Dunahoo is even less of a fiduciary nature.

Dunahoo signed no

contracts and entered into no contractual relationships of any
kind with appellants as of the signing of the option and lease
agreements.

As of that date appellants did not even have a

written offer to purchase or lease the property in question
from Dunahoo.

In fact at that time Dunahoo had met appellant

Lowenberg at the most only once.

(Tr. p. 221; testimony of

Lowenberg. )
It is difficult to perceive on what basis appellants
would have this Court extend the duties of a fiduciary to cover
their relationship with these answering respondents.

It is

submitted, however, that the law on fiduciary relationships
does not extend that far.
POINT IV
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR TBE COURT TO HAVE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSimlS OF LAl'l
Only because it is raised in appellants' brief is it
necessary to

add~ess

the question of there being findings of

fact and conclusio~s of law submitted and signed by the court
in this case.

Respondents do not dispite the fact that where

there has been a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed
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I

in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
directed verdict was granted.

That does not, however, imply

that findings of fact and conclusions of law should not be
submitted in the case.

The only cases addressing this subject

are ones in which there was an absence of findings of fact, and
the Court had to rule on whether the trial court should have in
fact filed such findings of fact.
The recent case of Smith v. Thornton, 458, P.2d 870
(Utah 1969) bears on this matter.

There Court said that in

such a case as the instant case, findings of fact
"need not" be filed.
not" be filed.

Nothing was said that findings "should

It is submitted that the filing of the findings

of fact is helpful to an appeals court to show what guided the
trial court in making its decision.

Those findings of fact can

be ignored by this Court if it so desires.

However, it seems,

a bit strong on appellants' part to insist that the findings be
entirely stricken from the record.

They are there and this

Court can use them as it sees fit.

POINT V
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES
IN ADDITION TO THOSE AWARDED BELO\"/
The option agreement (Ex. lP) specifically provided
that two months after its exercise, plaintiffs-respondents
needed to pay only the amount of the mortgage as a lease
payment until the time of closing.

However, upon the mailing

of the attempted recision letter, appellants demanded that the
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full amou~t of the lease payments be made.

Thereafter, and

until the time of trial, said additional payments were made.
The court below awarded judgment to plaintiffs-respondents in
the amount of the excess payments based on its finding that the
option agr€ement was validly and properly exercised by
plaintiffs-respondents and that plaintiffs-respondents were
entitled to the property.

Subsequent to filing the appeal,

appellants made a new demand they be paid the full amount of
the lease payments and not simply the amount of the mortgage
payments.

Upon motion, the court below on November 26, 1980

ordered plaintiffs-respondents to pay the said full amount
retroactive to the date of the trial.

Thereupon

plaintiffs-respondents did make the lease payments as ordered
and have thereafter to the present time made payments of the
full lease amount.

This case therefore should be remanded to

the lower court for a determination of the additional damages
to which plaintiffs-respondents are entitled as a result of
making said payments in excess of the mortgage payments since
ilie time of trial.

POINT VI
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES
Pursuant to the terms of the option agreement,
plaintiffs-respondents are entitled to attorneys fees incurred
in seeking to enforce the option.

Plaintiffs-respondents have

now incurred additional attorney's fees as a result of
defending this appeal.

This Court should therefore remand this

-27-
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matter back to the District Court for determination of the
additional attorney's fees to which plaintiffs-respondents are
entitled as a result of defending this

appe~l.

SUMMARY

The main thrust of appellant's claim on appeal is that
they were induced to sign the option agreement because they
thought the Fiber Science people were going to end up as the
ultimate owners of the property in question.

Inasmuch as the

Fiber Science people didn't end up as the owners, appellants
claim that they can rescind the option agreement.
The trial court granted the directed verdict in favor
of respondents and against appellants because appellants failed
completely to justify their claim.
law support them.

Neither the facts nor the

A review of the trial record leaves no doubt

that the critical elements of appellants' claim were never
established.

There was no basis for the trial court to present

the case to the jury.

That decision should be upheld by this

Court.
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The Court should remand this case to the lower court
for only one purpose: to determine the amount of additional
damages and attorney's fees plaintiff-respondents are entitled
to by reason of the appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February, 1981.
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